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Malaysian listed firms
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Mohd Eskandar Shah Mohd Rasidb
aDepartment of Finance and Accounting, INCEIF, Lorong Universiti A,
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
bDepartment of Finance, KENMS, International Islamic University, Malaysia
This article undertakes an in-depth study of the foreign exchange exposure of Malaysian
listed firms. We examine several issues related to firm-specific and overall exposure,
including an evaluation of the efficacy of adopting a hard-peg on such exposure. Our
sample consists of 158 listed firms and spans the 16 year period, 1990–2005.
A multivariate model using four bilateral exchange rates is used to determine firm level
exposure while panel data analysis using a random-effects Generalized Least Squares
(GLS) model is used to determine system-wide or aggregate sample exposure. We find a
total 71% of our sample firms to have significant exchange rate exposure, a rate
substantially higher than that reported for most countries, especially developed ones. The
US$ is by far the single most important source of exposure with 63% of sample firms
exposed to it. The sign of the beta coefficient for three of the four currencies are negative,
implying that our sample firms are largely net importers in these currencies. We find
exposure to be time variant and dependent on the sector within which a firm operates.
Interestingly, the panel data analysis which measures aggregate exposure, shows the US$
to be a significant source of exposure even with the adoption of the hard peg. The change
in policy regime to a fixed peg following the crisis appears to have had no impact at either
firm-level exposure or overall system-wide exposure.
Keywords: firm-specific; exchange rate; exposure; policy; switch
JEL Classification: E42; F31; F39
I. Introduction
The extent to which exchange rate exposure affects firm value
remains an interesting empirical question. Previous studies
that have examined this issue, in the context of the US and
other developed markets, have found minimal impact of
exchange rate exposure on firm value. This should not be
surprising since the US and developed European markets are
among the least open economies. Foreign trade as a ratio of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is small for these countries.
When the issue is examined for small and open emerging
markets, the results have been vastly different. Exchange rate
exposure appears to impact a much larger proportion of firms
within emerging economies and at a much higher magnitude
(Parsley and Popper, 2006). Yet, other studies have shown that
the direction of impact, whether positive or negative depends
on whether the firms are net importers/exporters and the
sector of the economy that they operate within.
Exchange rate exposure can be broadly defined as the extent
to which changes in exchange rates affect stock returns and
thereby firm values. In their seminal paper, Adler and Dumas
(1984), argue that a firm experiences exchange rate exposure if
*Corresponding author. E-mail: obiya@inceif.org; obiyathulla@yahoo.com
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its value is affected by changes in exchange rates. This
definition provides researchers the convenience of measuring
exposure as a coefficient in a linear regression of stock returns
on changes in exchange rates. While the size and sign of these
coefficients gives the magnitude and direction of the exposure,
there are two variants of exposure transaction or operating.
Transaction exposure results from the firm undertaking
foreign currency denominated transactions, the home-currency
value of which changes as exchange rate changes. Operating or
economic exposure on the other hand results from the firm
operating in a sector of the economy which is subject to foreign
competition. The coefficient of the regression equation there-
fore captures the net impact on the firm of both the direct,
transaction exposure and the indirect operating exposure.
In addition to the firm-specific factors, exogenous factors
like the exchange rate regime in place, monetary policy thrust
and the availability of instruments to manage the exposure,
would also be determinants. Since these determinants are
dynamic, it is possible that exchange rate exposure of firms
may be time variant. And indeed several studies, notably
Muller and Verschoor (2007) and Chue and Cook (2008) have
documented it as such. Where a firm’s profitability is
concerned, it is obvious that exchange rate changes could
affect it in multiple ways. Where the exposure is indirect or
some combination of direct and indirect exposure, the net
impact on a firm’s profitability and value will be hard to tell.
Framing the definition in line with Adler and Dumas (1984)
enables us to side-step these inconvenience and explains the
heavy use of this definition in the literature.
II. Motivation/Justification for Study
The objective of this study is to examine the extent of exchange
rate exposure that Malaysian listed firms face and the impact
on such exposure of changes in exchange rate policies. Our
period of study is the 16 year period, January 1990–December
2005. There are several reasons why Malaysian companies
would represent an interesting case for the study of exchange
rate exposure. Malaysia is a classic case of a small open-
economy, heavily plugged into the world economy. A trade
reliant nation, it typically has a Foreign Trade Ratio (FTR)1 in
excess of 200%. Foreign trade is key to the economy and has
always been so. Malaysia’s geographical location midway
between India and China and the so called ‘trade winds’ have
enabled Malaysia to be a centre of entrepot trade since
historical times. Thus, despite its size, Malaysia falls within the
top 20 trading nations of the world. Though manufactured
goods constitute the largest component of exports, commod-
ities such as palm oil, rubber, tin, timber and oil and gas
continue to be a sizeable portion of exports. While the majority
of manufactured exports originate from foreign-owned
Multinational Corporations (MNCs), often located within
designated free-trade zones, commodity exporters tend to be
locally-owned firms. Since most of these commodities have an
international price, the commodity exporters are essentially
price-takers. From an exposure viewpoint, the commodity
exporters typically have revenues in US$ since the interna-
tional price is US dollar denominated. Their costs, on the other
hand would mostly be in Malaysian Ringgit (MYR).
Aside from geographical and structural factors, policy wise,
there are a number of reasons why Malaysia presents an
interesting case. Though the country has traditionally had
liberal policies with regards to capital flows and currency
convertibility, Malaysia adopted stringent capital controls and
a currency peg of the MYR to the US$ following the East
Asian currency crisis of 1998.2 These were part of Malaysia’s
‘unorthodox’ policy response to the perceived speculative
attack on the currency. While the capital controls were for a
period of 1 year, the currency peg remained until July 2005.
From an empirical viewpoint, the impact of these varying
policy regimes on currency exposure of firms ought to be
useful.
Despite this very interesting blend of factors, with the
exception of Parsley and Popper (2006) who include Malaysia
as one of their 11 sample countries and Muller and Verschoor
(2007) who include Malaysian firms as part of a study on
Asian exposure, we are unaware of any in-depth study of the
currency exposure of Malaysian listed firms. Our article
benefits from the advantage of longer available data to fully
cover the period of the currency peg. Unlike the earlier two
studies, being Malaysia focused, this article is able to examine
episodes/events not within the scope of the previous studies.
We examine more companies, undertake sectoral analysis and
cover a much broader scope of issues. This article contributes
to existing literature in a number of ways. First, we focus on a
small and very open economy, which few previous studies have
done. Second, and more importantly, we examine the conse-
quences of a drastic enforced change in exchange rate regime
on the exposure of firms.
The article is divided into six sections. Section III below
examines relevant previous literature and synthesizes the key
findings. Section IV, presents our research questions and
describes our data and methodology. In the subsequent
Section V, we present our results and analysis. The final
section concludes by drawing out key lessons and implications
for policy.
III. Literature Review
The issue of exchange rate exposure on firm value appears to
have been rekindled in recent years. Increased exchange rate
volatility, currency crises and the renewed interest in regional
exchange rate arrangements may be some of the reasons for
this. Dominguez and Tesar (2006), examine the relationship
between exchange movements and firm values for eight
industrialized and emerging markets. They find that a signif-
icant proportion of their sample firms have the exposure. This
exposure, however, depends on the specific exchange rate and
varies over time. They attribute the time variance in firm level
exposure to firms dynamically adjusting their behaviour in
response to exchange rate risk. Ihrig and Prior (2005) examine
whether the type of exchange rate used and the size of the
1Computed as [(Exports þ Imports)/GDP], for 2007, the FTR was 200.2% GDP.
2On 1 September 1998 Malaysia announced the imposition of a 1 year moratorium on capital outflows (excluding current account outflows)
and the peg of the MYR to the US$ at 3.80 MYR per US$.
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movement matters in exchange rate exposure of the US
manufacturing firms. Based on a sample of US multinational
firms and domestic ones, they find that different industries
may have exposures only to specific exchange rates. This
implies that the use of a trade weighted index as earlier studies
have done, may have underestimated the extent of exposure.
They also show that some firms may have exposure only
during crisis periods whereas others during normal fluctua-
tions in exchange rates.
Two studies, Parsley and Popper (2006) and Muller and
Verschoor (2007) focus on exposure among Asian firms. The
first, examines firm level exposure across 11 Asia-Pacific
countries. They conclude that Asia-Pacific firms are signifi-
cantly exposed to exchange risk and have substantially higher
exposure than firms of industrialized countries. The extent of
exposure, though time varying has not diminished. In terms of
currencies, they find movements in the US$, the Yen and Euro
to be important sources of exposure in a few countries. Of
particular interest to this study, they find that ‘exchange rate
pegs appear to do little to alleviate the widespread exposure
against currencies other than the peg’. Asian countries have had
a range of soft and hard-pegs. In their sample, only two
countries had hard pegs: Hong Kong and Malaysia. While
Hong Kong’s peg to the US$ is maintained throughout their
study period, their study which ends in December 2002 only
covers approximately the first half of the nearly 7 years over
which the Malaysian Ringgit was pegged to the US$. Thus,
where Malaysia is concerned, their conclusion would certainly
need further validation.3
Muller and Verschoor (2007) confirm the significant
exchange rate exposure of Asian firms, mostly, to the US$
and the Japanese Yen. 70% of sample firms had long term
exposure to the US$. A depreciating Asian (home) currency
has a net negative impact on stock returns. Implying that, most
of their sample firms are net importers. They also show that
the extent of exposure often depends on the return horizon
chosen. Short horizons such as weekly returns may underes-
timate exposure whereas long ones such as 3 month return
horizons, may overestimate them.
In a single country study, De Jong et al. (2006), examine
firm-specific exposure of Dutch firms. Over their 5 year study
period, they find that over 50% of their sample firms are
significantly exposed to exchange-rate risks. Contrary to
Muller and Verschoor (2007), they report that a depreciation
of the Dutch guilder benefits their sample firms. Thus, these
firms must be the net exporters. They also show that the use of
a trade-weighted currency index and the use of individual
exchange rates are complements. Rees and Unni (2005), who
examine firm level exposure among French, German and the
UK firms, report findings similar to De Jong et al. (2006),
home currency depreciation, especially against the US$ ben-
efits the sample firms. Clearly, the direction of trade and
whether one is a net importer or exporter can explain whether
the impact of the exposure would be positive or negative.
However, as Chue and Cook (2008) find from studying 15
emerging markets over 6 years, the negative impact of home
currency depreciation which is significant in one sub-period,
disappears in a later period.
Examining Turkish firms over a 7-year period, Kiymaz
(2003) reports that the degree of exposure varies by the sector
in which the firm operates. Certain sectors are subject to much
higher level of exposure, usually due to higher reliance on
foreign trade and/or greater presence of foreign competition.
Interestingly, he also finds that the exposure of all sectors/
industries was lower in the period following the Turkish Lira
Crisis. The lower exposure post-crisis is attributed to the
increased attention of firms to their currency exposure.
A number of other papers have reported results that may be
peripherally related to this research. Aquino (2006) examines,
Filipino stock returns pre/post-Asian currency crisis. Though
stock returns were unaffected by exchange rate volatility in the
pre-crisis period, post-crisis he finds a risk premium for stocks
with currency exposure. Wong and Tang (2009) show vari-
ability in the real exchange rate to have positive influence on
Malaysian semi-conductor exporters and by implication on
their stock returns. Phylaktis and Ravazzolo (2005), examine
the short- and long-run dynamics between exchange rates and
stock prices for a group of Pacific Basin Markets.4 Their
findings suggest that stock and exchange rate markets are
positively related and that the US stock market acts as a
conduit for this links. Interestingly, they find that ‘foreign
exchange restrictions are not an important determinant of the
link between stock and foreign exchange markets on the one
hand and between the domestic capital and world capital markets
on the other hand ’. Lee et al. (2011), find significant spill over
from stock returns to exchange rates of six Asian countries.
They show correlations between stock and currency markets to
have increased in recent times.
Synthesizing the above papers with several others that have
examined firm level exposure, a number of common themes
are evident. First, firm-specific exposure varies by country,
time and industry sector. Second, the chosen exchange rate
matters. Using a trade weighted index tends to underestimate
exposure. The return horizon chosen also matters. Short
horizons such as daily and weekly returns underestimate
exposure whereas long ones like quarterly returns may
overestimate them. Third, firm level and overall market
exposures are different. Fourth, firms dynamically adjust
their behaviour in response to exchange rate risk. Finally,
where emerging markets are concerned, share values of most
firms are negatively affected by home currency depreciation.
IV. Data and Methodology
Given the key findings from previous studies and our objective
of evaluating the exchange rate exposure of Malaysian listed
firms and the consequences of policy change, we formulate the
following four research questions:
(a) What is the extent of currency exposure among
Malaysian listed firms?
(b) How time variant is this exposure?
3 In evaluating exposure over time, they have subdivided their sample period into three equal sub-periods of three (3) years each. Such
subdivision, however, does not match the events/episodes that had an impact on exchange rates, especially in the case of Malaysia.
4 Their data includes the Malaysian Stock Index. Their period of study is 1980–1998.
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(c) What was the impact of the change in exchange rate
regime on exposure of firms?
(d) How extensive is the variation in exposure by industry
sectors?
In identifying the needed data, we began with a list of all
firms that were continuously listed on Malaysia’s stock
exchange, Bursa Malaysia, from 1990 onwards. Eliminating
for suspensions, trading halts, lack of trading volumes and
other gaps in data, we are left with 158 companies. For these
158 firms, we computed monthly returns from January 1990
until December 2005, a period of 16 years. In examining firm-
specific exposure, we follow Parsley and Popper (2006) and
De Jong et al. (2006) of using several bilateral exchange rates.
Aside from the US$, which is an obvious candidate we looked
at previous literature and Malaysia’s direction of trade for
relevant foreign currencies. Based on direction of trade, other
than the US$, Yen, Chinese Yuan, British Pound, Singapore $
and the Euro would all be relevant.
Of these, the Euro and the Chinese Yuan had to be
dropped. The Euro for its short tenure and the Chinese Yuan
for the serious multicollinearity problem given its ‘peg’ to the
US$. Thus, we use the monthly bilateral exchange rates of the
US$, the Singapore dollar (SGD), Yen (JPY) and the Pound
(GBP) against the Malaysian Ringgit (MYR). We define the
exchange rate as the number of MYR per unit foreign
currency. The data were sourced mainly from Bloomberg
and Bursa Malaysia. In addressing our four research ques-
tions, we analyse both across firms (sectoral analysis) and over
time (by different sub periods). Broadly speaking, we do two
levels of analysis. We use firm-specific exposure for each of our
sample firms and then an overall/aggregated analysis. The
latter being the panel data analysis.
Following, De Jong et al. (2006) and Parsley and Popper
(2006), we measure firm-specific exchange exposure as follows:
Rit ¼ þ 1USDþ 2SGDþ 3JPYþ 4GBPþ et ð1Þ
Rit is the returns of stock i in month t less the returns on the
market index for month t.
The market index is proxied by the 100 stock, KLSE CI.
The use of multiple bilateral exchange rates instead of a
single trade weighted exchange rate has the advantage of
allowing the data/model to select which exchange rate is
significant for an individual firm. Equation 1 essentially states
that a firm’s excess return is a function of, or is determined by
changes in the four exchange rates. By taking excess rather
than total returns, we are measuring firm level marginal
exposure. The implicit assumption of constant variance in
Equation 1 is often untrue with time series financial data. To
overcome this problem, in line with previous studies, we add a
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity
(GARCH (1, 1)) specification to Equation 1. In addition,
De Jong et al. (2006), show that specification as in our
Equation 1, tends to underestimate exposure because of
multicollinearity in the exchange rates. They suggest using
the Wald test to correct for this. Accordingly, to correct for
potential multicollinearity we perform the Wald test to test
whether all four exchange rate coefficients are simultaneously
equal to zero. We do this for all firms that showed no exposure
using Equation 1. Where the Wald test is rejected, we identify
the currency coefficient that is significant and include that firm
as being exposed to that currency.
In analysing exchange rate exposure on an overall basis, we
do panel data analysis using a random-effects Generalized
Least Squares (GLS) regression model. This is done by
stacking each of our 158 sample firm’s data, as panel data
and estimating an overall Seemingly Unrelated Regression
(SUR). The advantage of this is that, it accommodates the
cross sectional correlation between the samples. While the
model specified in Equation 1 would enable us to estimate
exchange rate exposure for an individual sample firm,
Equation 2, enables us to estimate overall exposure across all
sample firms and subgroups of firms.
Ro ¼ ½Ri ¼
/1
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
/n
2
666666666666664
3
777777777777775
þ
11USD1 þ 12SGD1 þ 13JPY1 þ 14GBP1
..
.
11USDt þ 12SGDt þ 13JPYt þ 14GBPt
..
.
n1USD1 þ n2SGD1 þ n3JPY1 þ n4GBP1
..
.
n1USDt þ n2SGDt þ n3JPYt þ n4GBPt
2
666666666666664
3
777777777777775
þ
e1
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
en
2
666666666666664
3
777777777777775
ð2Þ
where, Ro is the overall/across sample return.
V. Results and Analysis
Firm-specific exposure
Tables 1 and 2, show the incidence of exchange rate
exposure among our sample of Malaysian listed firms.
Regressing Equation 1 and testing at a 5% level of signifi-
cance, a total of 112% or 71% of our 158 sample firms have
significant exchange rate exposure. Though this is a very high
level of exposure, it should not be surprising for the following
two reasons. First, as pointed out earlier Malaysia is a very
open economy with heavy dependence on international trade.
Second, previous studies, notably Muller and Verschoor
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(2007), have documented such high incidence among Asian
firms.5 Only 46% or 29% of our sample firms have no
exposure to any of the four currencies. The vast majority of the
exposed firms, 68% are exposed to a single currency. A one
third of the exposed firms have exposure to more than one
currency. A single firm had exposure to all four currencies.
Table 2 shows the breakdown of exposure by currency. Not
surprisingly, close to two-thirds (62.5%) of all exposed firms
have exposure to the US$. The US$ is by far the most
important source of exposure for Malaysian firms. The
Singapore dollar (SGD) and the sterling pound (GBP) both
share second place with 32% of exposed firms. Though
second, it is worth noting that it is a very distant second
placing. Surprisingly, despite Japan’s eminence as a major
trading partner of Malaysia, only one in eight (12.5%) of
exposed firms have exposure to Yen.
To examine the direction and magnitude of the exposure we
refer to Table A1 in the Appendix. Panel A of the table shows
the results of firm-specific exposure using Equation 1, Panel B
shows the overall exposure across all sample firms, determined
using Equation 2. From Panel A the arithmetic mean
coefficient is negative for three of the four currencies, implying
the firms are net importers. Appreciation of the foreign
currency causes a reduction in stock values/returns. The
coefficient for the US$ has the largest SD and range. Of the
70 firms with significant exposure to US$, an equal number
have positive as negative coefficients. Panel B is the more
important part where direction and magnitude of exposure
for overall market is concerned. The US$, Yen and Pound
have negative betas whereas the SGD positive. The implication
is that our sample firms are net importers in the first three
currencies but net exporters where the Singapore dollar is
concerned. Aside from being consistent with findings of
previous studies, this result is logical since a substantial
portion of Malaysia’s exports are through Singapore. In terms
of statistical significance, only two currencies the US$ and
GBP would be significant at 5%. The Singapore dollar (SGD)
would be significant at 10%. However, the yen is insignificant.
Taken together, Table A1 shows the overall importance of the
US$. Not only does it affect the most of the firms, it also has
the highest coefficient. A 1% appreciation of the US$ against
the Malaysian Ringgit would cause a 0.25% reduction in firm
value. One can imagine the destruction in firm value when the
US$ rose sharply against the MYR during the currency crisis
of 1997/1998. The surprise result is the strong influence of the
GBP. Though it impacts a smaller number of firms, its beta is
marginally higher than the US$.
Exposure over time and exchange rate regime
In addressing our second question about whether exposure
varies over time, we divide our 16 year study period into
subperiods. From an exchange rate viewpoint, there were two
key events that would have impacted exchange rate exposure.
First, the East Asian currency crisis of 1997/1998 and second,
the fixed peg regime that followed. Accordingly our subdivi-
sion is as follows: a first sub-period from June 1997 to August
1998 which covers the period of the crisis and a second sub-
period, September 1998 to July 2005 which was the period over
which the Ringgit was pegged to the US$.6 With this
subdivision, we would also be able to determine what the
impact of the peg was on firm level exposure, our third
research question. Table 3 shows the breakdown of exposure
by currency for the two sub-periods and the overall period.
The difference in the number of firms exposed is striking.
The number of firms with significant exposure shows a marked
decline in the crisis and peg period relative to overall period.
This is particularly true for the US$ and GBP, both of which
were highly significant in Table A1. The number of firms with
exposure to the US$ which was 70 for the overall period, falls
to 30 in the crisis period and remains at 33 in the peg period.
There appears to be a somewhat ‘permanent’ reduction in
exposure where the US$ is concerned. Though surprising,
these results are in line with Kiymaz (2003) who reports a
reduction in exposure for Turkish firms in the period following
the Turkish Lira Crisis. Ihrig and Prior (2005) also report a
similar reduction in exposure among multinationals following
the Asian currency crisis.
Table 1. Firm-specific exposure by number of currencies
Currencies exposed to Number of firms % to exposed firms
Zero 46 0
One 76 68
Two 29 26
Three 6 5.4
Four 1 0.8
Notes: Total firms with exposure to at least one currency¼ 112
(112/158¼ 71% of firms have exposure).
Table 2. Incidence of exposure by currency
Currency Number of firms % of exposeda
USD 70 62.5
SGD 32 29
JPY 22 12.5
GBP 32 29
Note: aThe sum total is more than 100% since many firms have
exposure to more than one currency.
Table 3. Firm-specific exposure by sub-periods
US$ SGD JPY GBP Total
Overall 70 32 22 32 156
Crisis 30 11 30 12 83
Peg 33 32 20 11 96
5 They show that more than 70% of their sample firms have exposure to the US$.
6 The Ringgit was pegged to the US$ from 1 September 1998 to 21 July 2005, a period of about 7 years.
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The yen and SGD which were insignificant earlier, now
show a slightly different picture. Aggregating across all firms
and currencies, the incidence of firm-specific exposure falls to
about 50% and 60% respectively, during crisis and peg period
relative to that of overall period.7 Despite the sharp reduction
in the number of firms that were exposed, the magnitude of
exposure is a different story. Panel A of Table A2 shows the
mean coefficient, max and min values and breakdown by sign
of the coefficient for the overall period and the two sub-
periods. The mean coefficient is simply the arithmetic average
of coefficients across all sample companies. Notice the very
substantial increase in mean coefficient for all the four
currencies during the crisis. For the US$, SGD and JPY, the
mean coefficient during the crisis period is more than 10 times
higher than that of the overall period. Whereas only the GBP
was statistically significant for the overall period at the 5%
level, all four currencies are significant during the crisis. What
this numbers tell us is that, firm-specific exposure was on
average more than 10 times higher during the period of the
currency crisis. In addition to the large increase in the
magnitude of exposure, the range and SD is also much
higher. Given the exchange rate volatility during the crisis, this
is not surprising. When we look at the direction of the
exposure as represented by the sign of the beta coefficient, we
again see interesting differences. Whereas in the overall period,
there was an equal number of firms with (þ) and () signs for
US$ exposure, during the crisis, it is heavily skewed to negative
coefficients. Of the 30 firms with significant exposure to US$
in the crisis period, only two have (þ) coefficients, the
remaining 28 have negative coefficients. This means that at
the firm level, the vast majority of Malaysian firms were
susceptible to an appreciation of the US$ against the Ringgit
and not the other way round, where appreciation of the
Ringgit against the US$ would have helped.
The last four columns of Panel A show firm-specific
exposure during the period of the currency peg. The mean
coefficients for all the four currencies are much lower than
what they were in the prior crisis period. However, they are
still higher than that of the overall period. Thus, though lower
than during the crisis, firm-specific exposure was on average
higher during the peg than that of the overall period. The US$
and SGD are once again insignificant. That the US$ is
insignificant should not be surprising given that the Ringgit is
now pegged to the US$. The Yen and GBP remain as
significant source of exposure. Interestingly, the beta coeffi-
cient of the Yen which was positive earlier is now negative.
There also appears to be a better balance between the number
of firms with significant positive and negative coefficients.
Taken together, what this results tell us is that, during the
7-year peg period, firm-specific exposure resulted not from the
US$ but from the other currencies, the Yen and GBP in
particular. The US$ had an impact on firm values, but not
significantly. Given the Malaysian government’s stated ratio-
nale for the currency peg, these results are consistent.
Panel B of Table A2 shows the results of panel data analysis
using Equation 2, for the two sub-periods. Again we see the
much higher beta coefficients and therefore higher exposure
for all the four currencies during the crisis. With the exception
of SGD which comes close, the other three currencies are
significant. These results are similar to the firm-specific
numbers of Panel A for the crisis period. Comparing the peg
period results using Equation 2 with the firm-specific results
for the same period, we again see similarities. The size of the
beta coefficients had reduced, as was the case earlier. The signs
of the coefficient are also similar; the SGD is the only currency
which is not negative. The one inconsistency is the US$. The
US$ which was insignificant where firm-specific exposure was
concerned, is now significant and strongly so. In fact all the
four currencies, including the SGD are now significant. While
the Ringgit was only pegged to the US$, it would fluctuate
against the other currencies as much as the US$ does. Thus,
continued exposure to the other currencies is not a surprise.
That the US$, despite the peg, remains a source of exposure to
Malaysian firm values/stock returns is a puzzle. Even so, this is
a result consistent with the findings of Dominguez and Tesar
(2006) who show that firm-specific and overall exposures are
different. Firm level exposure they argue, is time variant,
changes signs, differs by sector and is otherwise dependent on
firm level dynamics. Exposure at the aggregate economy level
however, is shown to be fairly constant. It is precisely this
aggregate level exposure that our Equation 2 is measuring. Our
results reinforce Dominguez and Tesar’s (2006) proposition
that firm-specific and overall exposures are different.
Is firm-specific exposure time variant?
Going by what Table 3 showed, it is fairly evident that firm-
specific exposure does vary with time. This appears to be the
case for all the four currencies. To confirm, if indeed, exposure
is time variant we re-examined the incidence of exposure for
each of our sample firms over the three period categories. The
objective is to see if a firm with exposure in one period also
shows exposure in another. To avoid clutter, we focus only on
exposure to the US$. Figure A1 and the Venn diagram
accompanying it show the results. Cumulating across all three
period categories, there were a total of 94 individual firms with
US$ exposure. Of these, as seen in the Venn diagram, only two
companies had consistent exposure to the US$ over all the
three periods. All other exposed companies, show no signif-
icant exposure in at least one of the other periods. Of the 70
firms that showed up as having significant US$ exposure for
the overall period, 36 did not have exposure either during the
crisis or peg period. Eight firms had exposure only during crisis
while 13 only during the peg period. Consistent with findings
of earlier studies, we can only conclude that firm-specific
exposure is dynamic with its incidence being time variant.
Analysis by sector
Several previous studies have noted the variance in currency
exposure by sector of the economy. In line with this, we had
formulated our last research question to examine the extent to
which exposure varies between firms in different industry
sectors. Our sample of 158 companies spans the 12 sectors
which comprise all the listed firms on Bursa Malaysia.
Though the distribution is uneven, 98 of our sample companies
were within the four largest listed sectors i.e., (i) Trading and
Services, (ii) Plantation, (iii) Industrial Products and (iv)
7 (83/156 for crisis period) and (96/156) for peg period).
Firm-specific exchange rate exposure and impact of changes in exchange rate policy 2979
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [I
NC
EI
F]
 at
 23
:58
 18
 Ju
ne
 20
12
 
Finance. Since the remaining samples were thinly spread out
over the other eight sectors, we focus our sectoral analysis on
only the above four sectors.
Table A3 shows our results. Panel A shows the number of
firms with significant exposure by currency and sector. The
large decline in the number of firms exposed during the crisis
relative to overall period, seen earlier in Table 3 is evident
again, especially in the case of the US$. The higher incidence
of exposure in the period of the peg relative to the crisis period
appears to be even more prominent here.
Looking across Panel A of Table A3, notice that the number
of firms with significant US$ exposure is higher during the peg
relative to crisis. Surprising, but consistent with that we saw in
Table A2. One sector that stands out in contrast to the others
is the plantation sector. This sector consists mostly of oil palm
and/or rubber plantation operators. Of the four sectors, the
plantation sector is the most involved in international trade
with exports constituting a large portion of sales. Besides being
net exporters, they are price-takers with their commodity
products having an international price denominated in the
US$. Given these, we see some interesting dynamics for the
plantation sector. Though eight plantation firms, 42% of
the sector’s sample, had significant exposure to US$ in overall
period, none were exposed during the crisis to the US$. Thus,
the crisis had minimal impact on the valuation of plantation
firms. Yet, during the period of the peg to the US$, the sector
experiences higher exposure to the US$ with five firms having
significant exposure.
The mean coefficient for each sector by currency and sub-
period is shown in Panel B of Table A3. Again the plantation
sector stands out. Mean coefficient is a positive 1.27 for the
overall period, reduces to zero during the crisis and increases
to 3.1 during the US$ peg. As seen from Panel A, exposure for
the plantation sector increased during the peg, though in a
favourable way. When we examined the signs of the coefficient
for firms with significant exposure within the plantation sector,
we found them all to have positive coefficients. All the eight
plantation firms that had significant exposure in the overall
period had positive beta coefficients just as all the five in the
peg period had. This is one sector that is highly export-driven
and appears to have benefitted from the switch in exchange
rate regime. Comparing between sectors and over the different
periods tells us two important things. First, there are obvious
differences in the type and extent of exposures among the
sectors. Second, for a given sector, the type or direction of
exposure, whether positive or negative, varies over the
different subperiods. Surmising from these results, one can
only conclude that exchange rate exposure not only varies by
sector but as we saw earlier is also time variant.
VI. Conclusion
This article constitutes an in-depth study of the foreign
exchange exposure of Malaysian listed firms. Being a
country-specific study, it examines several issues related to
exposure, including an evaluation of the efficacy of adopting a
hard-peg on firm-level and system-wide exposure.
We find that a total 71% of our sample firms have
significant exchange rate exposure. This extent of firm-specific
exposure is higher than that reported for most countries,
especially developed ones. The US$ is by far the single most
important source of exposure with 63% of sample firms
exposed to it. The GBP and SGD are a distant second.
Aggregating across all sample firms, the US$ and GBP are
significant sources of exposure whereas the two Asian curren-
cies, the Yen and SGD are not. The sign of the beta coefficient
for the US$, GBP and Yen are negative, implying that our
sample firms are largely net importers in these currencies. We
find exposure to be time-variant and dependent on the sector
within which a firm operates. Very few of our sample firms had
consistent exposure over different sub-periods. Sectors like
plantation which is heavily reliant on exports and has a US$
denominated price for its products, show significantly positive
beta coefficients to the US$, had minimal impact during the
crisis and benefitted from the peg.
While these results were by and large consistent with
findings documented for other markets previously, where our
results differ is in the substantial variance we find between
firm-level and aggregate cross sample exposures. At the micro
level, firm-specific exposure shows a marked reduction during
the crisis period with only about half the number of firms
showing significant exposure. This marked reduction remains
in the post-crisis peg period, though there is a slight increase in
the number of firms exposed. The US$ ceases to be a
significant source of exposure where firm-specific exposure is
concerned. However, our panel data analysis which is designed
to measure aggregate exposure, shows the US$ to be a
significant source of exposure even with the adoption of the
hard peg. Collectively, what these results seem to be telling us
is that the outbreak of the crisis forced firms to better manage
their exposure, thereby resulting in fewer firms with significant
exposure. However, the much touted change in policy regime
to a fixed peg following the crisis appears to have had no
impact at either firm-level exposure or overall system-wide
exposure.
In a sense, these results validate the findings of Parsley and
Popper (2006) who argue that though exchange rate regimes
changed drastically in several of their sample countries,
exchange rate exposure had not reduced. That, exposure
arising from the fluctuation of the Ringgit to other currencies
would continue following its peg to the US$ is to be expected,
but how do we reconcile the fact that the US$ continues to be a
significant source of exposure to Malaysian companies even
during the peg?
To see how this is possible, we need to keep in mind two
factors, first, our definition of exposure and second the nature
of the peg. Recall that in the context of this study, we use the
standard definition of exposure, as changes in the market value
of a listed firm as a result of changes in exchange rates. This
raises the question, how could the US$ continue to impact firm
values if its value to the Ringgit has been fixed? We believe that
this has to do with the nature of the peg or more specifically
with the exchange rate at which the Ringgit was pegged to the
US$. Over the 1980s until the currency crisis in mid-1997, the
Ringgit was on a de facto peg to the US$ at about 2.50 per
US$. Following the crisis and the sharp depreciation of the
Ringgit, it was pegged to the US$ at 3.80 per US$ effective
from 1 September 1998. At 3.80, the Ringgit has had a
depreciation of 35% and was grossly undervalued by any
measure. While it is one thing to peg and eliminate exchange
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rate volatility, it is another to peg at an ‘undervalued’ rate.
When most listed firms are net importers, as our earlier results
clearly show, an undervalued exchange rate destroys firm
value. This value destruction will be ongoing and will continue
as long as the peg is in place. Thus, firm values can change
even though the exchange rate is unchanged. Unlike some
policy changes that cause a one-off change and lead to a new
equilibrium, here the crunch is continuous. Particularly, since
the Malaysian economy has a myriad of price controls on a
wide range of products making it difficult for higher import
costs to be passed on. In contrast, net exporters like the
plantation sector will experience consistent increase in firm
value as long as the peg is in place, even if the US$ price of
commodity is unchanged. In short while, a peg can eliminate
transaction exposure arising from that currency, it could under
certain circumstances alter the competitiveness and thereby
accentuate operating exposure.
Thus, in evaluating the efficacy of the fixed-peg, one can
only conclude that the policy appears to have had no impact
on reducing exchange rate exposure of firms but had adversely
impacted the values of the vast majority of Malaysian listed
firms that were net importers.
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Appendix
Table A1. Firm-specific and overall exposure (January 1990–December 2005)
Panel A: Firms-specific exposure – using Equation 1
USD SGD JPY GBP
Number of observations 158 158 158 158
Mean coefficient 0.1573 0.0297 0.0126 0.1958
SD of coefficient 1.1855 1.0176 0.3334 0.3674
Maximum coefficient 1.7543 3.8973 1.1498 1.1052
Minimum coefficient 3.9021 2.406 0.9588 1.1657
Firms with þve coefficient 35 13 12 6
Firms with ve coefficient 35 19 10 26
Panel B: Overall exposure (across full sample) – using Equation 2
coexcessren j Coefficient SE z P4jzj [95% Conf. Interval]
usd j 0.2559162* 0.0503839 5.08 0.000 0.3546668 0.1571655
jpy j 0.0188501 0.0264022 0.71 0.475 0.0705974 0.0328973
gbp j 0.2656522* 0.029002 9.16 0.000 0.322495 0.2088094
sgd j 0.1333673 0.0692346 1.93 0.054 0.00233 0.2690645
_consj 0.0047767* 0.0007343 6.51 0.000 0.0033376 0.0062159
Note: * Denotes significance at 5% level.
Overall Crisis Peg Overall &
Crisis 
Overall
& Peg 
Crisis & 
Peg
Overall, Crisis
& Peg 
No. of Firms Exposed  
70 30 33 17 15 3 2
Fig. A1. US$ exposure by periods
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